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BRIEF STATEMENT RE APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final decision in a civil matter arising from 
the Second District Court, Davis County. This case was originally filed in the 
Utah Supreme Court and the case was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2a-3, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953, as amended) [hereinafter referred to as "UCA"]. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
See Plaintiff-Appellants Brief, pages 1-3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was brought in March, 1990 by Floor Coverings by 
Certified, Inc., a Utah corporation [herein referred to as "Floor Coverings" or as 
the "Plaintiff"] (R.309-317, Amended Finding of Fact 2) against Stacy B. Morgan 
and Kristin P. Morgan [herein referred to jointly as "the Morgans" or as the 
"Defendants"], (R.309-317 Amended Finding of Fact 1), in an attempt to recover 
for floor coverings [labor and materials] that were supplied to the Defendants by 
Plaintiff and to foreclose a mechanic's lien on certain real property of the 
Morgans. 
COMMENT ON DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants make representations on page 5 of their Brief [first full 
paragraph], concerning what occurred at a Sheriffs sale. This statement is not 
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correct and it is not supported anywhere in the record. As a result, it should be 
disregarded by the Appeals Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The lower court erred when it granted the Judgment because: 
1. The Defendants waived their right to assert any defense that 
were not pled, including that the Notice of Lien was illegal and unenforceable, the 
issue was not tried by consent and the Defendants never sought relief to have their 
Answer amended. 
2. The Notice of Lien satisfies the statutory requirements, but to 
the extent it does not, it was in substantial compliance with the law. 
3. A judgment should have been entered against the Morgans 
because they did not have a contractors bond. 
4. The Defendants Answer should have been stricken under Rule 
11 because it was not signed and they should not have been able to present 
evidence in support of their defenses at the trial. 
5. The Defendants are not entitled to an award for attorneys fees 
and are estopped to assert that they were the successful party below. 
ARGUMENT 
Petitioner asserts the following points of law in support hereof: 
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I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The appellate Courts in Utah are to accord no particular deference to 
the trial court's legal conclusions, Hoth v. White. 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 53 (Ct. 
App. 1990), Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 R.T.2d 467, (Utah 
1989), but should not set aside the factual findings unless they are against the clear 
weight of the evidence. Id. 
II. DEFENDANTS WAIVED RIGHT TO ASSERT DEFENSES NOT 
PLEAD 
A. TRIED BY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONSENT 
Under the Utah case law, a defendant does not have to raise an 
"avoidance" or an "affirmative defense" in his pleading if the issue is tried by the 
express or implied consent of the parties. Mabey v. Kay Peterson Constr. 682 
P.2d 287 (Utah 1984). 
Defendants rely in their Brief on the case of General Insurance Co. 
v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp.. 565 P.2d 505 (Utah 1976). In that decision, the 
Supreme Court held that the way to amend pleadings by implication during the 
trial is "by the introduction of evidence without objection". Id. at 505 (emphasis 
added). 
In the case sub judice. Plaintiffs counsel made a motion in limne 
[R.T. 3-6] at the start of the trial and objected to the introduction of evidence in 
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support of any defenses that were not plead by the Defendants. Therefore, there 
is no basis for finding that the Defendant's Answer was amended implicitly, by the 
introduction of evidence without objection at the trial. With Plaintiffs objection 
in the record, the only defenses that were properly at issue were those that were 
listed in the Morgans' Answer. 
Defense counsel did not say anything concerning the validity of the 
lien prior to his closing argument. He made no motion to amend the Defendants' 
Answer before, during or after the trial, to include any defenses that were not 
pled. He failed to take these remedial steps despite the fact that (a) he had 
received the Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum (R. 241-251) in which the Plaintiff had 
objected to the Defendants' assertion of any defenses that had not been pled 
[including that the Lien was defective], and (b) Plaintiff had presented a motion 
in limne to prevent the introduction of evidence on any defenses that had not been 
pled. Therefor, the defenses that had not been pled were not tried expressly or by 
implication, nor was the Answer amended to include their defenses. 
B. DEFENSES NOT RAISED WHEN THERE IS NO GENERAL 
DENIAL 
Defendants assert in their Brief (p. 11) that a party does not have to 
plead objections to a complaint because they "are preserved by the denials [set 
forth in the answer] of the allegations contained within [said complaint]". This 
4 
appears to be a partially correct statement of the law in Utah based upon the 
General Insurance case. That Court determined that "any matter that does not tend 
to controvert the [[plaintiffs] prima facie case shall be pleaded, and is not put in 
issue by a general denial under Rule 8(b)". 545 P.2d at 504. Stated positively, 
it says that general denials preserve the defenses that arise as a direct consequence 
of the plaintiffs prima facie case. 
However, this proposition does not benefit the Morgans. Their 
Answer [Exhibit "E"] does not contain any general denials of the allegations of the 
Complaint. All it contains are the following affirmative defenses: (1) they were 
only acting as agents for Miles Construction when they went through Don Smith 
to have the carpeting and vinyl installed at their place and the agreement was with 
Don Smith, not Plaintiff; (2) they were not acting as a general contractor; (3) 
Miles Construction had a bond; (4) they were not the owners of the subject 
property at the time they had the job was ordered; and (5) they were not unjustly 
enriched. 
Assume arguendo that the Morgans did not have to plead the defenses 
which they relied upon at the trial. Since there were no general denials to the 
prima facie case, then, under the General Insurance analysis, their defenses were 
not raised by the pleadings in this case. This is supported by the fact that Rule 12 
(b) requires a defendant to plead "every defense, in law or fact". Therefore, the 
5 
Defendants unpled defenses were waived. 
C. DEFENSES INCLUDED BY A GENERAL DENIAL 
The Defendants assert, based on the General Insurance case, that they 
did not have to plead their defenses to the mechanic's lien case because they would 
"merely controvert plaintiffs prima facie case". In order, to consider the Morgans 
assertion, we will look at the Plaintiffs prima facie case and compare that with 
what the Defendant's were attempting to prove as their defenses. 
As a general rule, a claimant's prima facie case is: 
1. the name of the reputed owner or the name 
of the record owner of the property; 
2. the name of the person by whom he was employed or to 
whom he furnished the equipment or materials; 
3. that his materials were installed upon, or he 
did labor relating to, construction at the 
property; 
4. the charge for the materials and installation, 
or their value; 
5. the time when the first and last labor was 
performed; 
6. that a preliminary notice, if applicable, was 
served on the contractor; 
7. a description of the property; 
8. that a Notice lis pendens was prepared and 
recorded; and 
9. that a Notice of lien was recorded and 
served. 
§38-1-1, et seq., UCA ; 53 Am.Jur.2d Mechanics's Lien §§375-382. 
In this case, the Defendants attempted to defeat the Plaintiffs lien case 
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by showing, among other things, that (a) they did not order the job from the 
Plaintiff, but Don Smith did, (b) the amount listed on the Lien as the amount due 
was not correct, (c) there were disputes with Plaintiff as to billing and service, (d) 
Morgans were not the contractors, (f) Morgans were not the owners of the 
property, (e) there was no contract between Morgans and the Plaintiff, (f) there 
was nothing subscribed and sworn to by Mr. Delahunty, (g) the Lien failed to 
identify the proper parties that entered into the contract, (h) there was no 
verification on the lien, (h) Floor Coverings contract for the carpet and vinyl was 
with Mr. Smith and not with them, and (i) the Lien failed to identify the true 
contractor and the true owner. 
While some of these asserted defenses may arise from the allegations 
of the Complaint, many of them do not. For example, the Complaint did not 
embrace the idea that Don Smith had anything to do with the transaction nor was 
it apparent from the Notice of Lien. Defendants claim that the Lien was somehow 
unenforceable because Don Smith was the one who ordered the materials. 
Plaintiffs could prove their prima facie case without mentioning Don Smith. 
Plaintiffs could, also, prove their prima facie case without mentioning 
or alluding to (a) any billing or service disputes, (b) any contractual relationship 
with the Defendants, (c) the amount listed on the face of the Lien Notice as being 
due, (d) details concerning the Lien's verification, etc. 
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In reading the Plaintiffs Complaint, it is not apparent from its face 
that the Notice of Lien would not be enforceable for any of the reasons advanced 
by Defendants at the trial. Since their defenses were not apparent from the 
pleading, then it was incumbent upon the Morgans to plead them as defenses. 
Even if we assume that the Morgans' Answer contained a general 
denial [which it does not], these are not the kind of claims that would have arisen 
automatically from the face of the Complaint. At the least, they are "matters 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense" which must be pled under Rule 
8(c). 
Defendants waived these defenses, and they should not have been able 
to present the same at the trial. The trial court committed error when it made 
findings of fact and reached a legal conclusion based upon a waived defense. 
III. TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED CLAIM BASED UPON 
MECHANICS LIEN 
A. CHANGE IN STATUTORY LANGUAGE 
The requirements for a mechanics' lien notice that were in force 
during this case, §38-1-7, UCA. provided that it contain: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known, or, 
if not known, the name of the record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he was 
employed or to whom he furnished the equipment 
or material; 
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(c) the time when the first and last labor was 
performed . . .; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for 
identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his 
authorized agent and an acknowledgment or 
certificate as required under Chapter 3, Title 57. 
The Defendants, in their Brief (p. 13), go to great lengths to discuss 
"the exact procedure for verification" of a Notice of Lien. They claim this 
procedure is not set forth in the statute, but has been determined by case law, and 
is applicable to the present case. By way of illustration, they discuss the 
correctness of the lien verifications in these major cases: Project Unlimited. Inc. 
v. Copper State Thrift & Loan. 798 P.2d 738 (Utah 1990) ["Project"]: 
Worthington & Kimball Constr. Co. v. C & A Development Co. 777 P.2d 475 
(Utah 1989); Mickelson v. Craigco. Inc.. 767 P.2d 561 (Utah 1989); and First 
Sec. Mortg. Co. v. Hansen. 631 P.2d 919 (Utah 1981). 
Defendants fail to take into consideration that the liens in all of those 
cases arose under the mechanics' lien law that was in effect prior to 1984. Since 
that time, new laws were adopted that made key changes in the statutory language. 
In the most recent of these cases, the court in Project noted that the 
purpose behind the lien statute is remedial, and that a "lien, once acquired by labor 
. . . should not . . . be defeated by technicalities, when no rights of others are 
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infringed, and no express command of the statute is disregarded." [citing Eccles 
Lumber Co. v. Martin. 31 Utah 241, 249, 87 P. 713, 716.]. The Project case 
indicated that the Utah courts and the legislature have embraced the modern view, 
which dispenses with arbitrary rules that have no demonstrable value in a 
particular situation. 
One example of the adoption of the modern view by the legislature, 
according to Project court, was the enactment in 1985 of a new mechanic's lien 
law: 
Requirements under the 1984 version of this law [§38-1-7] 
which are no longer part of the statute include (a) actual 
verification of the statements in the lien, (b) a statement of [the 
claimant's] demand . . . . [,and] a statement of the terms of . 
. . his contract. 
798 P.2d at 744, fh. 4 (emphasis added) 
Since Floor Covering's Lien was recorded long after the changes in 
the law, then no verification is required in the present case. The decisions cited 
by the Defendants which discuss that issue at length are inapplicable. 
In the Project decision, the Court, also, discussed another change in 
the lien law [in 1989]. In lieu of the burdensome verification, the legislature 
required that current lien notices should contain an "acknowledgment or 
certificate", and this acknowledgement or certificate only had to comply with 
Chapter 3, Title 57. LI, at 746, fn. 8. The purpose behind the simplification of 
the Lien requirements was so that legal minutiae would not triumph over the rights 
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of most mechanics lien claimants. 
B. COMPLIANCE WITH CHAPTER 3, TITLE 57 
The statute requires that a Lien notice contain "the signature of the 
lien claimant or his authorized agent and an acknowledgment or certificate as 
required under Chapter 3, Title 57. . . .". §38-l-7(e), UCA. 
The first sub-section of Chapter 3, Title 57, allows for the recording 
of any document in the recorders office if it contains one of the following — a 
"certificate of [its] acknowledgment, or of the proof of [its] execution, or a jurat 
as defined in Section 46-1-2, or other notarial certificate containing the word 
"subscribed and sworn" or their substantial equivalent, [and] that is signed and 
certified by the officer taking the acknowledgement, proof or jurat." §57-3-1, 
UCA. The second sub-section, provides that notarial acts affecting real property 
"shall be performed in accordance with Chapter 1, Title 46". kL 
1. Jurat 
One option available that satisfies the requirements of section 1, is the 
use of a notarial "jurat". Under the Notary Public act, a "jurat" is defined to be 
"a notarial act in which the notary certifies that the signer, whose identity is 
personally known to the notary or proven on the basis of satisfactory evidence, has 
made, in the notary's presence, a voluntary signature and taken an oath or 
affirmation vouching for the truthfulness of the signed document." §46-1-2(3). 
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The Notice of Lien [Exhibit "D"] had an attachment which was 
executed by a notary and stated that: "before me, the undersigned notary, 
personally appeared Alan Delahunty, as the Vice President of Floor Coverings. 
. ., who was personally known to me [or whose identity was satisfactorily proved 
to me) to be the person who signed the preceding document in my presence and 
who swore or affirmed to me that he signed it voluntarily for its stated purpose, 
that the document is truthful, and that the document was signed on behalf of said 
corporation, by authority of a Resolution of the corporation's board of directors 
and acknowledged that the corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed 
is the seal of said corporation", (emphasis added) 
In comparing the Plaintiff's Lien Notice with the jurat requirements, 
we find that (a) the Mr. Delahunty's identity was properly determined, (b) in the 
notary's presence, he made a voluntary signature of the Lien, and (c) he took an 
oath or affirmation vouching for the truthfulness of the Lien. Therefore, the Lien 
was properly recorded under Title 3, Chapter 57, and satisfies the related lien 
provision. 
2. Acknowledgement or Certificate 
The Court could determine that when the Lien statute uses the 
specificate words "acknowledged" or "certified", it means as those terms are 
defined in Title 3, Chapter 57. 
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Under Title 3, a "certificate of acknowledgement" is acceptable if it 
contains the words "acknowledged before me or their substantial equivalent". §57-
2a-6, UCA. 
Under the relevant part of §57-2a-2, the phrase "acknowledged before 
me" is defined as: 
(a) that the person acknowledging appeared before the 
person taking the acknowledgement; 
(b) that he acknowledged that he executed the document; 
(c) that, in the case of: 
(ii) a corporation, the officer or agent 
acknowledged that he held a position or title set 
forth in the document or certificate, he signed the 
document on behalf of the corporation by proper 
authority, and the document was the act of the 
corporation for the purposes stated in it. 
(d) that the person taking the acknowledgement: 
(i) either knew or had satisfactory evidence that 
the person acknowledging was the person named in 
the document or certificate; and 
(ii) in the case of a person executing a document 
in a representative capacity, either had satisfactory 
evidence or received a the sworn statement that the 
person had the proper authority to execute the 
document. 
In comparing the Acknowledgment statute to the Notice of Lien, we 
find that (a) Mr. Delahunty personally appeared before the notary and he 
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acknowledged that (b) he executed the Lien, (c) he was the Vice President of the 
Plaintiff corporation, (d) he signed the Lien on behalf of the Plaintiff with proper 
authority [by Resolution of the corporation's board of directors], (e) the Lien was 
the act of the corporation, and (f) his identity was properly determined. As a 
result, the Lien has a "certifcate of acknowledgment" that satisfies all of the 
statutory requirements and should meet the related lien provision as well. 
The provisions for an "acknowledgement", also, indicate that the 
Statutory Short Form which is set out in the statute "is acceptable under any law 
of this state." §57-2a-7, UCA. That Form is: 
STATE OF ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this (date) by 
(person acknowledging, title, or representative capacity, if any). 
Signature of Person taking Acknowledgement, Title 
[seal] 
My Commission Expires: Residing at: 
Since this form contains the words "acknowledged before me", then 
it has to meet the same requirements as the Certificate of Acknowledgement, 
discussed above. 
3. Substantial Compliance 
Even if the Acknowledgement or Certificate portions of Plaintiffs 
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Lien do not satisfy every single requirement of the law, substantial compliance is 
all that is required. The Project decision stated that "even assuming that the 
legislature intended the inclusion of the jurat which conformed with the notary 
statute, substantial compliance would certainly be sufficient to satisfy that 
requirement". 
It should be noted that, in drafting the notary attachment to the Lien, 
Plaintiff used the recommended forms for Notary Certificates found in the Utah 
Notary Public Guide [Utah Department of Business Regulation, 1988] [Exhibit 
"F"]. Forms A, B, and C set forth almost identical information to that contained 
in Plaintiffs Notice. Thus, the Notice's Certificate should be assumed to be 
correct. 
Even if the Plaintiff had to satisfy the old "verification" standard, 
since they met the "jurat" requirements, under the Project case that is sufficient as 
a verification. 
C. FIRST ALLEGED LIEN DEFECT 
The first defect found by the trial court in the Notice of Lien was that 
amount claimed as being due and owing was incorrect. As was discussed in the 
Project case, under the prior lien law a claimant had to include a statement of his 
demand, less any set-offs, and a statement of the terms of his contract. These 
provisions were removed from the Lien law to make the mechanics lien process 
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simpler and less burdensome. Trial courts should not require a Lien claimant to 
do what the legislature has not. As a general proposition, a claimant need not 
satisfy any tests that are not specifically set forth in the mechanic's lien law. 
Buehner Block v.Glezos. 310 P.2d 517 (Utah 1957) [if notice satisfies the statutory 
requirements, then it does not have to set forth any other information which might 
be useful or desirable]. 
The Lien in the present case satisfies the law in this regard and 
should have been enforced by the lower court. 
D. SECOND ALLEGED LIEN DEFECT 
The next defect found by the trial court in the Notice of Lien was that 
the persons listed on the Lien [the Morgans] were not the ones who hired Plaintiff. 
The mechanics lien statute allows the lien claimant an option to list the 
"name of the person by whom he was employed or [the name of the person] to 
whom he furnished the equipment or material" §38-1-7(b), UCA [emphasis 
added]. Even if the Morgans were not the persons who hired Floor Coverings, 
they were the persons to whom the material was furnished. The trial court entered 
a judgment against the Morgans based upon unjust enrichment (R.309-317, 
Amended Conclusion of Law 4) because they were the persons who had benefitted 
from the installation of the carpet and vinyl. Therefore, by listing the Morgans 
on the Lien as the persons to whom Floor Coverings furnished the materials, the 
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second part of subsection (b) is satisfied. 
Moreover, the Project Court [followed in the case of For-Shore Co. 
v. Early. 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (1992)], adopted a more liberal standard in 
reviewing objections to the descriptive terms in a lien notice. The test they applied 
is "whether interested parties have been informed of the existence of the lien and 
whether the lien has misled or prejudiced those parties". 798 P.2d at 747. If the 
lien notice informs the interested parties that the lien exists on identifiable 
property, and the complaining party has not been misled by the descriptive 
provisions of the lien, then the courts will tend towards finding substantial 
compliance. 
In applying this test to the facts before the Court, the Lien Notice 
[Exhibit "C"] informs the Morgans of the fact that Floor Coverings is claiming a 
lien against a particular piece of property and when the work was performed. 
There is no evidence in the record that the Morgans were misled or prejudiced by 
any portion the Notice's description. Therefore, the Notice is in substantial 
compliance with the lien law and the lower court erred in finding that the Notice 
of Lien was defective in this regard. 
E. THIRD GROUP OF ALLEGED LIEN DEFECTS 
Judge Cornaby found the following technical problems with Lien: 
(a) the signature of the corporate Plaintiff was that of an officer 
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only. 
(b) the corporate officer did not state under oath that the 
contents of the Lien were correct. 
(c) the notary was the person "who swore or affirmed to me that 
he signed it voluntarily, for its stated purpose and the document is truthful". 
For the most part, these issues are subsumed in the discussion above 
as to whether the Lien had a proper "Acknowledgement or Certificate". In 
addition, the argument in the Plaintiffs Brief (pages 17 - 21) deals with the fact 
that the signature was that of the Plaintiff corporation. 
Assuming arguendo that the Notice falls short in some particular with 
respect to satisfying the lien law requirements, under the Project case analysis, it 
is in substantial compliance with the lien law. 
IV. JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENTERED BASED UPON 
FAILURE TO HAVE A CONTRACTOR'S BOND 
A. ISSUE WAS RAISED BELOW 
The Defendants assert that because the issue as to their failure to have 
a bond was not set forth in the pre-trial order, then it was not raised below. They 
assert that the case of Estate of Wolfinger v. Wolfinger. 793 P.2d 393 (Utah App. 
1991) supports that position, but that is not true. The pre-trial order in Wolfinger. 
listed two issues for trial, but the trial court decided the case on a third issue. The 
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Court upheld that result. It considered the interplay between Rule 16(b) [which 
includes pre-trial orders] and Rule 15(b), which allows for liberalized amendment 
of the pleadings to conform with the evidence at the trial. The Wolfinger court 
relied upon the case of Stubbs v. Hemmert. 567 P.2d 168, 170, which held that 
"where no objection was made to the introduction of evidence it is deemed that the 
Court modified the pretrial order as a matter of its own discretion." In Wolfinger. 
since the defendant made no objection to the introduction of the evidence in that 
case, and demonstrated no prejudice as a result, then she exposed herself to 
whatever ruling the evidence would support. 
This decision is supported by the general rule which allows for the 
amendment of the pleadings by implication during the trial "by the introduction of 
evidence without objection". General Insurance Co. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp.. 
565 P.2d 505 (Utah 1976). 
In this case, the Morgans did not object to the introduction of evidence 
relating to their failure to have a bond (R.T. 81), and they have not shown that 
they suffered any prejudice as a result. The trial judge entered a finding [24] and 
a conclusion [9] based upon the bond theory. Therefore, the issue as to the 
Morgans' failure to have a contractors bond was properly before the trial court and 
raised on appeal. 
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B. NO RELIANCE ON MILES CONSTRUCTION BOND 
The Defendants claim that they should not be required to obtain a 
bond if Miles Construction had one. 
In this case, the Morgans received an allowance for carpeting from the 
builder, Miles Construction, but the Morgans had to make their own arrangements 
for the purchase and installation of the floor coverings at their new home. (R.T. 
93 and 99). To that extent, the Morgans were acting independently of the 
construction company. As such, they had to act to protect the rights of any 
laborers or materialman who supplied the floor coverings at their direction. 
C. PLAINTIFF WAS A MATERIALMAN UNDER 
CONSTRUCTION BOND STATUTE 
In Defendant's Brief they rely upon the case of Bailey v. Parker. 778 
P.2d 1005 (Utah App. 1989) to support the position that the Plaintiff was not a 
"materialman" under thee Contractors' Bond statute, which relieves the Morgans 
from having to obtain a bond for the carpet work. 
The Bailey case is similar to the present case, but it differs at a telling 
point. The buyers in Bailey had been in contact with a Mr. Smith to look at 
samples for floor covering. The buyers agreed to purchase carpet only, from Mr. 
Smith, and contracted with another person for its installation. 
The court held that the sole service provided by Mr. Smith was to sell 
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the buyers carpeting, and he purchased the carpeting from a carpet vendor on 
account, not as part of the remodeling for the house. Therefore, the suing carpet 
vendor was not a materialman under the bond statute. 
By contrast, in this case the Defendants entered into a contract with 
Don Smith. Mr. Smith was to arrange for the sale and installation of the floor 
coverings by the Plaintiff. (R.T. 147, 149, 151, and 158). The Plaintiff dealt 
directly with the Morgans, supplied the carpeting and vinyl from their store, and 
did the installation. (R.T. 9-30). Both parties knew that the Plaintiffs materials 
and labor would be used in construction work on the Morgans new home. 
Since the case at bar did not involve the purchase of floor coverings 
independently from its installation, then the Plaintiff is a materialman who's labor 
should have been covered by the Morgans' bond. 
D. CONTRACT EXCEEDING $2 ,000 UNDER 
CONSTRUCTION BOND STATUTE 
See argument in Plaintiffs Brief, pages 21 - 23. 
V. DEFENDANTS WAIVED DEFENSES IN UNSIGNED ANSWER 
Rule 11, URCP. provides that "[i]f a pleading . . . is not signed, it 
shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the 
attention of the pleader . . . .". [emphasis added] 
Defendants do not contest that an unsigned pleading should be 
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stricken. They assert, instead, that the Answer was signed. However, if that were 
true, then they would have pointed to the place in the record that supports that view. 
Without said support from the record, the Defendants' Answer should be stricken, 
Moore's Federal Practice ^11.002[1], and judgment should be entered for the 
Plaintiff. 
VI. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
A. UNDER RULE 33 OF THE RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Defendants assert a right to an award of attorneys fees under Rule 33 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure for a frivolous appeal. In order to address this 
issue, the Plaintiff has set forth below an analysis as to the general basis for this 
appeal. 
The relevant portion of the mechanic's lien statue lists five provisions 
that relate to the drafting of a notice of lien. §38-1-7, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended). The trial court in this case found that the Plaintiffs Notice of Lien 
satisfied some, but not all of the requirements of that statute. The Utah courts have 
consistently taken the position that a lien claimant does not have to comply with every 
facet of the notice requirements. His lien will be valid and enforceable if it is in 
substantial compliance with the Mechanics Lien Statute. Graff v. Boise Cascade 
Corp.. 660 P.2d 721 (Utah 1983); Roberts Investment Co. v. Gibbons & Reed 
Concrete Prod. Co.. 449 P.2d 116, 22 Utah 2d 105 (Utah 1969). 
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In addition, the position of the Utah Courts and legislature has been in 
flux. They have now adopted the modern view allowing for compliance with the 
statute where the lien notice informs the interested parties that the lien exists on 
identifiable property, and the complaining party has not been misled by the descriptive 
provisions of the lien. Moreover, the legislature has changed the law to remove the 
lien verification requirement, and replace it with just an "Acknowledgement or 
Certificate". There have been no Utah decisions that have dealt with issues arising 
under this new statutory language. 
Since the Plaintiff satisfied most of the lien requirements, and the law 
and approach the courts have adopted is more liberal than before, then it is only 
logical for Floor Coverings to argue on appeal that the lower court misapplied the law 
in this case, because their lien was in substantial compliance. 
Plaintiffs counsel has been representing them for almost fifteen years. 
They are involved in mechanics' lien situations on a continuing basis, and wanted to 
appeal to determine how the new law would be interpreted. 
From the extensive arguments set forth in the Plaintiffs briefs in this 
matter, it is apparent that this appeal has not been filed in violation to Rule 33. 
B. UNDER RULE 68 (B) 
Rule 68(b) does not provide a basis for an award of attorneys fees. If 
the Plaintiff is successfully on mechanics' lien or contractor's bond issues on appeal, 
then they would be entitled to an award for costs. 
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C. UNDER MECHANICS LIEN STATUTE 
Defendants are not entitled to an award for attorneys fees because (a) 
they did not plead any such request, (b) they agreed that they were not entitled to 
such an award, and (c) they have not shown an equitable basis for relief. 
Since Plaintiffs counsel made a motion in limne [R.T. 3-6] at the start 
of the trial and objected to the introduction of evidence in support of any matters 
that were not plead by the Defendants, then this issue was not tried by express or 
implied consent. With. Plaintiffs objection, the only matters that were properly at 
issue for trial were those listed in the Morgans' Answer, and they did not include a 
request for attorneys fees. 
The mechanic's lien statute provides that "[i]n nay action to enforce any 
lien, the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee". 
§38-1-18, UCA In his closing argument, Mr. Vanderlinden, in reliance on this 
section, stated, the "[s]tatute talks about the successful party I don't think that 
anybody has been the successful party." (R.T. 195). Defendants should be estopped 
from claiming now that they were the successful party. 
A general rule to be applied in judicial proceedings is that a party will 
not be allowed to take a position on a matter that is directly contrary to that which he 
previously assumed, where he is chargeable with full knowledge of the facts and 
another will be prejudiced thereby. Estate of Christensen v. Christensen. 655 P.2d 
646 (Utah 1982); Caldwell v. Anschutz Drilling Co.. 13, U.2d 177, 369 P.2d 964 
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(1962). 
Certainly, in this case, Mr. Vanderlinden was fully cognizant of the 
facts, and Plaintiff will be prejudiced in expending the time and resources to fight this 
issue on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the preceding argument, the lower court's judgment should 
be reversed to the extent it denied Plaintiff the right to foreclosure as prayed on the 
mechanics lien against the property of the Morgans [with a deficiency if necessary], 
and for their failure to have a bond, and judgment should be entered for Plaintiff, in 
the sum of $2,040, and with an award for a fee for filing and recording the Notice 
of Lien [$100], for foreclosure costs, for all pre-judgment costs, and for an award of 
attorneys fees through the end of the trial in accordance with the evidence that was 
introduced at the trial, and for an award of fees and costs following the trial and for 
the appeal, and for after accruing fees and costs. 
DATED this 14th day of July, 1992. 
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR 
& ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorn^ys-^TPlaiBt iff-Appellant 
Paul Franklin Farr 
25 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that 4 true and correct copies of the foregoing 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF was mailed, postage prepaid, first class, 
to: 
Steve C. Vanderlinden, Esq. 
STEVE C. VANDERLINDEN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
1133 North Main, Suite 200 
Layton, UT 84041 
this 15th day of July, 1992. 
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Steven C. Vanderlinden #3314 
STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Defendants 
1133 North Main, Suite 200 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Telephone (801) 544-9930 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FLOOR COVERINGS BY CERTIFIED, 
INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STACY B. MORGAN and KRISTIN 
P. MORGAN, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900747303CN 
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
The above-entitled matter having come on for trial on the 31st 
day of May, 1991, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, District 
Court Judge. The Court, having previously entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGES and DECREES 
judgment against the Plaintiff in the sum of ?80.40, together with 
post-judgment costs and interest. 
DATED this j £ day of /^-T^/^/- , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
c:\wp\docs\misc\morgan.fof 
S 
^j^x^DouglasTrr/Cornaby 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
~L C~£_ 
0053935 
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Steven C. Vanderlinden #3 314 
STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Defendants 
113 3 North Main, Suite 2 00 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Telephone (801) 544-9930 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FLOOR COVERINGS 
INC. , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STACY B. MORGAN 
P. MORGAN, 
Defendants. 
BY CERTIFIED, 
and KRISTIN : 
: AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
: JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900747303CN 
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
The above-entitled matter having come on for trial on the 31st 
day of May, 1991, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, District 
Court Judge• The Plaintiff was present and represented by his 
attorney, Paul Franklin Farr. The Defendants were also present and 
represented by their attorney, Steven C. Vanderlinden. The court 
having heard testimony by both parties, and their witnesses, and 
having received exhibits as evidence, and the court having reviewed 
the testimony of the parties and good cause appearing; hereby 
enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Defendants are residents of Davis County, Utah. 
2. The Plaintiff was a corporation duly organized and 
validly existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its 
•—• ci / 3 .••• M. ~o 
~ «.l .1-00 
principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and 
was, at all times relevant, in the retail floor coverings business 
[hereinafter referred to sometimes as "Floor Coverings"]. 
3. On or about the 15th day of November, 1989, Plaintiff 
furnished the first materials and labor and, on or about November 
17, 1989, Plaintiff furnished the last of said materials and labor 
in performing the job [Invoice 27 02] at the Property. 
4. The property located at 773 South 825 East in Davis 
County, Utah [hereinafter the "Property"] was a residence, and the 
Defendants1 clos€>d on their purchase of the same on November 24, 
1991. Defendants were the owners of said Property at the time the 
Notice of Lien was recorded against the same. 
5. That Plaintiff thought the prices to be paid to them for 
the installation and the purchase of the carpet was $11.25 and the 
price to be paid for the purchase and the installation of vinyl was 
$9.75. 
6. That the Defendant thought that the price to be paid to 
Plaintiff for the purchase and installation of the carpet was 
$10.75 per yard and $9.75 per yard to purchase and install the 
vinyl. 
7. That the Defendants believed they were entering into a 
contract with Don Smith and the Plaintiff believed they were 
entering into a contract with the Defendants. 
8. That no contract existed between the Plaintiff and 
Defendants. 
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9. On November 24, 1989, at the closing of the Defendant's 
home, the Defendants paid Miles Construction Company Contractor 
$1,500.00 for the purchase and installation of the carpet and vinyl 
for their home. 
10. In June, 1990, Miles Construction Company gave the 
Defendants $1,500.00 for the carpet and vinyl that was purchased 
in their home so that the Defendants could send the money on to the 
Plaintiff. 
11. Plaintiff sent the Defendants an invoice [Invoice No. 
2702], relating to said job, shortly after the work was completed 
on November 17, 1990 seeking the immediate payment of the same. 
The amount asserted to be owing therein was $2,115.00. 
12. Since said invoice was not paid by Defendants,- then 
Plaintiff mailed a Preliminary Notice of Intent to File a Lien to 
the Defendants about January 3, 1990. On January 19, 1990, Floor 
Coverings caused a Notice of Lien to be filed with the Office of 
the Davis County Recorder [Entry No. 880784, Book 1332, Page 818, 
hereinafter "Notice of Lien"]. 
13. On June 12, 1990, Defendants sent Plaintiff a check for 
$2,040.00 for the carpet and vinyl purchased and installed in their 
home by. the Plaintiff. 
-14. That the Plaintiff urged the Court to find an accord and 
satisfaction pursuant to the Answer filed by the defendants on 
April 9, 1990. The Court did not do so. This action was filed on 
March 15, 1990. On March 23, 1990, Allen Delahunty and Stacy 
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Morgan met at the property- A step was repaired and the floor was 
remeasured. At the conclusion the Plaintiff agreed to deduct 
$75.00 from the bill due to its error. The balance due was 
$2,040.00. 
15. That on June 26, 1990, the Court received the Plaintiff !s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, to strike Defendants' Answer, and for 
default judgment. Also filed on the same date was an Affidavit 
signed by Alan Delahunty. The Plaintiff's attorney also signed 
this Affidavit wherein he claimed to have mailed a copy to the 
Defendants on May 18, 1990. That on June 10, 1990, the Defendants 
mailed to Plaintiff's attorney, Paul Franklin Farr, a check for 
$2,040.00 to settle the matter. The Defendants mailed the 
$2,040.00 check to the Plaintiff in an offer to settle the .case, 
although no writing expressed such intention. The Court awarded 
the Plaintiff judgment on August 1, 1990 for $2,040.00 plus $136.00 
interest, plus lien costs $100.00, plus lien foreclosure costs of 
$308.00, plus a reasonable attorney fee of $1,000.00. The total 
was $3,584.00. The Plaintiff's "counsel held Defendants' check 
until after the judgment was awarded and then cashed it on August 
7, 1990. On October 11, 1990, Steven~JZ. Vanderlinden made an 
appearance for the Defendants and filed *a Motion to Set Aside the 
Summary Judgment. On October 18, 1990, the Plaintiff caused a 
public sale to be made of Defendants' property pursuant to the 
judgment. The Plaintiff's attorney bid $3,855.10 at the public 
sale, claiming that to be the amount owing. The Court found the 
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actions of Plaintiff's attorney outrageous and granted a temporary 
restraining order. 
16. That Defendants have acknowledged from the beginning that 
they owed the Plaintiff money for the carpet and vinyl installed 
in their home but have consistently claimed it was less than the 
$2,115.00 claimed by Plaintiff. 
17. That the Plaintiff billed the Defendant for 50 yards of 
vinyl at $9.75 per yard for a total of $487.50 and 13 0 yards of 
carpet at $11.25 per yard for a total of $1,4 63.53. The total for 
both the carpet and vinyl was $1,951.00 before taxes, and $2,115.00 
with taxes and $40.00 miscellaneous fees. 
18. That after the liens had been filed, Plaintiff 
acknowledged a $75.00 error in its calculations and stated that his 
bill should be $2,040.00. 
19. That because there was no contract between the parties, 
and different prices were discussed, the Court determined that 
$9.75 per yard for the purchase and installation of the vinyl is 
reasonable and $11.25 for the purchase and installation of the 
carpet is reasonable. 
20. Three expert witnesses were called on the total yardage 
of carpet and vinyl installed in the home, none being a party to 
the lawsuit. Said witnesses testified that they went to the home 
to measure the carpet. Dennis Vanderlinden testified that there 
was 121.3 yards of carpet installed with a value of $1,3 64.94, and 
40 yards of vinyl installed for a purchase price of $390.00 and a 
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total price of the carpet and vinyl of $1,754.94. David Searle 
testified that there was 122.2 yards of carpet for a value of 
$1,374.75 and 45 yards of vinyl for a value of $438.75 for a total 
purchase price for both the carpet and vinyl of $1,813.50. Dean 
Chidester testified that there was 118.67 yards of carpet for a 
value of $1,335.04 and 40 yards of vinyl for a value of $390.00 for 
a total purchase price of $1,725.04. 
21. That the difference between the high and the low figures 
testified to in court is approximately $150.00. 
22. That the difference in the amount owed is significant to 
the Defendants. 
23. That the amount owed in the notice lien is incorrect. 
24. That no one testified as to whether or not there was a 
bond in place. However, the Court assumes that there was no bond. 
25. That the lien statute does not require privity between 
the parties and Plaintiff properly listed the Defendants as the 
owner or reputed owner of the property. 
26- That the lien filed by the Plaintiff correctly stated 
when the labor was performed, November 17, 1989, and gave a proper 
description of the property, however, " the signature of ,the 
corporation is the * signature of an officer only. The corporate 
officer does not state under oath that the contents of the lien are 
correct. The notary on the lien is the person who states "who 
swore or affirmed to me that he signed it voluntarily, for its 
stated purpose, and the document is truthful." 
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27. That Plaintiff incorrectly listed the person by whom he 
was employed even though he believed the Defendants were the ones 
that hired him. 
28. That based on the above, the lien is unenforceable. 
29. Plaintiff is to be paid for unjust enrichment in the 
amount of $1,800.00 plus $40.00 preparation and the appropriate 
sales tax of $119.60 for a total amount to be paid of $1,959.60. 
30. That Plaintiff presently has in his possession $2,040.00 
of Plaintifffs money meaning the Plaintiff owes the Defendant 
$30.40. 
31. That each party is to bear their own attorney's fees and 
costs incurred herein. 
32. That the previous sum deposited with the Court in the 
amount of $3,855.10 is to be returned to the Defendants. 
33. Shortly after the work was completed on November 17, 
1990, Plaintiff mailed Defendants1 Invoice 2702, seeking the 
immediate payment of the same. The Plaintiff asserted that 
$2,115.00 was the correct principal amount then due and owing. 
34. Thereafter, no payment was made by the Defendants within 
the next thirty days. As a result, Plaintiff contacted Defendants 
to request payment. 
35. In this case no payment was thereafter made and Plaintiff 
sent Defendants a Preliminary Notice of Intent to file a lien. 
36. In the sale of the carpeting for installation at the 
Property, Plaintiff acted with the expectation of being compensated 
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therefor in an amount equal to the reasonable value of the 
materials and services furnished, and it was not acting as a 
volunteer. 
37. The Notice of Lien was filed within the time required by 
the mechanics1 lien statute and on or about January 19, 1990, 
Plaintiff mailed a copy of said Notice of Lien to Defendants by 
certified mail. 
38. The Lien showed what the Plaintiff believed at the time 
the Lien was prepared and recorded[that the principal amount due 
and owing was the sum of $2,115.00]. 
The Court having entered its FINDINGS OF FACT, hereby enters 
its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the District Court had jurisdiction over the above-
entitled matter. 
2. That Plaintiff's lien filed in the above-entitled lien 
is void and unenforceable. 
3. That there was no contract existing between the Plaintiff 
and the Defendants and therefore no bond was necessary. 
4. That the Plaintiff is entitled to the sunfjof $1,959.60 
on the theory of unjust enrichment. 
5. That the Defendant has previously ^tendered to ^ the 
Plaintiff $2,040.00 leaving a net amount due and owing to the 
Defendant of $80.40. 
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6. That the Defendant is entitled to receive back the check 
previously deposited with the Court in the amount of $3,355.10. 
7. That neither party is entitled to attorney's fees or 
court costs. 
DATED this fL? day of /£-+*J-TS- 1991. 
NOTICE 
To: Paul Franklin Farr 
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Busch Forum, Suite 540 
5295 South 320 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-4711 
You are hereby notified that pursuant to the rules of the 
Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504, you have five (5) days after 
receipt of these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment to file an Objection. 
DATED this /7^day of Qfrfa>*^ ' 1991. 
c:\wp\docs\imsc\morgan. fof 
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Paul Franklin Farr (#1040) 
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 540 
BUSCH FORUM 
5295 South 320 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-4711 
Telephone: (801) 263-5555 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH 
FLOOR COVERINGS BY CERTIFIED, 
INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STACY B. MORGAN and KRISTIN 
P. MORGAN, 
Defendants. 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) Civil No. 900747303CN 
) Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
TO THE PARTIES HERETO, BY AND THROUGH THEIR RESPECTIVE 
ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, AND TO THE COURT: 
YOU are hereby notified that the above-entitled Plaintiff hereby appeals to 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah from the Order and Judgment entered in this 
action on October 29,1991. 
DATED this 26th day of December, 1991. 
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF APPEAL was mailed, first class, postage prepaid to: 
Steve C. Vanderlinden, Esq. 
1133 North Main, Suite 200 
Layton, Utah 84041 
this is ^ T d a y of " D ^ - * ? 199 /. 
Patrih-Franffin Fan 
ICTICZ CF LIEN Ei S 3 0 7 3 4 - BK 1 3 3 2 PG S I 
CflRCL DEPN PAGE.- DAVIS CNTY RECORDER 
KEEN RECCRIED, 21AIL TC: 1550 JArf 1? 3 :01 Ptt FEZ 9 .00 DE? J 
SEC*D FDR FLOOR COVERINGS BY CERTIFIED 
FLCOH C0VZHHIG3 BY CERTIFIED, ETC. 
P . O . BOX "- .-• # 5 2 6 2 5 6 
SAIT L A O CITY, U T A E ' ~ - ^ 8 4 1 5 2 8iTII8S§K3 
NOTICE: SEND COPY CF NOTICE CF LIEN BY CERTIFIED MAIL, JAN 1 9 1990 
EETuEN RECEIPT REQUESTED, TC CWKER. 
The undersigned Floor Coverings by Certif ied, Inc. 
hereby gives notice of intention to hold and d a r n a l i en upon 
the property and improvements thereon owned and reputed to be 
owned by Stzcey B. & K r i s t i n P. Morgan and located 
in ~Davis County/ Utan, waica property i s mere 
particularly as follows: 
SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A" 
Exhibit "A" i s attached hereto and incorporated 
herein bv reference. The amount demanded hereby i s 
$ $2 ,115 .00 owing to the undersigned for labor and materials 
to improve the above described property. 
The undersigned was employed by Stacy B & K r i s t i n P. Morgan 
who was the (owner) (contractor)/ suca being done by toe 
undersigned under a contract made between said (owner) 
(contractor) and the undersigned by the terns and conditions of 
waica the undersigned did agree to furnish floor coverings in 
consideration of-payment to the undersigned of $ $2,115.00 
upon completion of the job and under which contract the f i r s t 
labor and materials were finished on the 15th day 
of November , 19a 9 and the last labor and materials were 
furnisned on the I7thday of November 1S8J£ 2nd for a l l of 
which labor and materials the undersigned became entitled to 
$ $2 ,115 .09 which i s the reasonable value thereof, and on 
wfaica payments have been made and credits ard offsets allowed 
^ anounting to $ "?~ • „ ^ e a y * n g a fca^anc2 owii^s to the 
C-.*l?^ersigned of $$2 + 113.00 after deducting a l l just credits 
^Q^^Bn^/bf&ets, and for which demand the undersigned holds and 
^ ^ v & a l i ^ ^ y i l e n by virtue of the provisions of Chapter 1, Tit le 
Sr^^a^OfcfiPCdcte Annotated 1953. 
• y.i^sEnBsr 1::v* Eima COVERINGS BY 
(SEAL) / Secretary"") fetSorized Officer 
E? SS07S-4- BK 1332 PS Ci J.7 
STATS OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake) 
ss. 
On this ft day 01 
ilan Deiantmty, II 
"before me, the undersigned notary, 
Vice President of Floor Coverings personally appeared AI 
by Certified, Inc., who is personally known to me (or whose identity 
was satisfactorily proved to me) to be the person who signed the 
preceding document in my presence and who swore or affirmed to me 
that he signed it voluntarily for its stated purpose, that the document 
is truthful, and that the document was signed on behalf of said 
corporation by the authority of a Resolution of the corporations 
board of directorsand acknowledged that the corporation executed 
the same and that the seal affixed is the seal of said corporation. 
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April 4, 1990 
To Whom It May Concern; 
This is in reply to summons served upon Stacey and Kristin Morgan 
regarding Floor Coverings by Certified, Inc., vs., Stacey B. 
Morgan and Kristin P. Morgan. On November 24, 1989, we purchased 
a home from Richard Miles Construction and Development. Prior to 
purchase, Miles Co. authorized us to make arrangements for floor 
coverings to be installed at 773 S. 825 E. Layton. We made an 
agreement with Don Smith for floor coverings. The agreement 
included price and quantity. Don Smith then contacted Floor 
Coverings and instructed them to contact us to arrange for 
installation. 
Upon receipt of an invoice for service and material on or about 
December 1, 1989, we forwarded the invoice to Miles Co. At that 
time we contacted Floor Coverings-" regarding discrepancies in 
billing and unsatisfactory work. Floor Coverings subsequently 
contacted us again, whereby we contacted Miles Co. regarding 
payment. Floor Coverings then sent preliminary notice to lien, 
whereby we again contacted Miles Co. regarding payment. Floor 
Coverings subsequently attached lien to property while disputes 
regarding billing and service still existed. 
After lien was filed, Miles Co. sent us a check for an amount 
they determined was reasonable. We are still in possession of 
this check and do not wish to redeem or endorse as it may absolve 
Miles Co. of further liability. On March 23, 1990, we reached an 
agreement with Floor Coverings regarding disputed invoice and. 
service. 
We are in the process of attempting to have Miles Co. pay 
interest, court fees, and attorney fees for which they are 
responsible. At no time in the period from November 8, 1989 to 
March 23, 1990 did we represent ourselves as anything but agents 
of Miles Co., which we were duly authorized to be. During this 
time, Miles Co. made no or little effort to pay the bill in a 
timely manner nor did they attempt to resolve any billing 
discrepancies in a timely manner. Floor Coverings.by Certified 
knew of the agency relationship between us and Miles Co,, yet 
they made no attempt to collect against Miles CoT, who was the 
bonded owner of the said property when said floor coverings were 
installed. 
Response to Allegations 
#4 We were not the owners of property located at 773 S 825 E. 
Layton when flooring was installed in said property. 
#5 Contract was never entered into by us with Floor Coverings-
#16 Never at any time did we act as general contractor. We were 
authorized by general contractor (Miles Co.) to act as an agent 
to procure floor covering. 
#21 General contractor did obtain bond for work performed. 
#3o We were not unjustly enriched as we paid general contractor 
for floor coverings when we purchased the property. 
Stacey B. and Kristin P. Morgan 
Recommended Forms of Notary Certificates 
A. If the signer is personally known to the notary: 
In die County of , State of Utah, on 
this day of , 19 , 
before me, the undersigned notary, personally appeared 
(signer's name) , who is 
personally known by mc to be the person whose name is signed on the 
preceding document, and acknowledged to me that he /she signed it 
voluntarily for its stated purpose. 
Notary signature and seal 
B. If the signer proved his/her identity through documentary evidence: 
In the County of . State of Utah, on this 
day of , 19 , 
before mc, the undersigned notary, personally appeared (signer's 
name) , who proved to mc his/her identity through 
documentary evidence in the form of a
 m 
to be the person whose name is signed on the preceding document, and 
acknowledged to mc that he/she signed it voluntarily for its stated purpose. 
Notary signature and seal 
. . . ^ v u u . i I . W O U I J I U U I I V , u u i u c , I M C L a w b U l U L d l l dr i l l T U U . 
State of Utah, Department of Business Regulation, Division 
of Corporation & Commercial Code. Spring 1988. 
C. If the signer took an oath vouching for the truthfulness of the document. 
In the County of , State of Utah, on this day 
of 19 , before me, the undersigned 
notary, personally appeared (signer's name) 
who is personally known to me on "who proved to me his/her identity 
through documentary evidence in the form of a 
to be the person who signed the preceding document in my presence and 
who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is voluntary and the 
document truthful. 
Notary signature and seal 
D. If notarizing that the document is a true and correct copy of the original: 
In the County of , State of Utah, on the 
day of 19 , I certify that the preceding document 
is a true, complete, and unaltered photocopy made by 
of (description of document) . 
Notary signature and seal 
